The Central African Republic: No one in charge

While the security situation remains volatile, the 6000 African Union-led peace keepers (MISCA)   supported by  French soldiers (2000) and recently added European Union forces  (500), have prevented already dire situation from getting even worst. Backed by a Security Council resolution, MISCA has led efforts to provide security to the war-torn country since January 2014.  The AU-led Mission has recorded some encouraging results: In coordination with France-led Operation Sangaris including EUFOR-RCA, MISCA has played a decisive role in restoring basic security: enabled the new transitional Government to undertake its work, ensured freedom of movement of international actors, secured key installations and sites of internally displaced persons, protected national and international stakeholders including members of the transitional institutions. The peace keepers have also disarmed and cantoned some ex-Seleka elements as well as collected arms and improved security on the crucial transport corridor linking the port city of Douala Cameroon, to Bangui— ensuring much needed supply of basic humanitarian aid. The new Government, meanwhile, has also taken steps to reconstitute the national armed forces, through requesting all ex-soldiers to return their barracks.

In spite of all the efforts, the humanitarian and security situation remain acute in the immediate and very worrying in the middle and long-term. While there’s no uniform standard for assessing the security situation, field reports frequently point at pockets of gruesome violence, vengeful brutality and perpetuation of cycles of retaliatory killings. A recent report from the Commission on the Movement of People, estimates that over 602891 peoples have been displaced from their communities. Bangui alone, host 177891 of the internally displaced peopled, over 25 percent of the city’s population.

No hurting stalemate

Most of the recent violence is associated with an increased activism of anti-Balaka forces. Although no clear understanding of their organizational structure, the anti-Balaka groups— comprising of local defence groups and rogue elements of the armed forces of the Central African Republic and criminal elements— are reportedly becoming more organized in Bangui and other parts of the country .  On the other hand, ex-Seleka forces have retreated away from the capital, exposing vulnerable Muslim population to what the UN describes as ‘’systematic targeted violence’’ by anti-Balaka forces. Equally disturbing, MISCA has recently reported a spike in attacks against its operations and those of other international partners by anti-Balaka forces.

Without a decisive victory by any of the two major warring groups, the dynamics of the conflict is becoming complex and complicated. While the anti-Balaka forces struggle to establish their authority and control in the capital, the threat they pose extend beyond revenge killings of Muslims. Criminal gangs and unemployed youths motivated by seamless opportunities to loot and kill have joined them, too. There are even reports of fights between the seemingly revenge-inspired and loot-based anti-Balaka groups. Due to the messy and fluid nature of their interests, MISCA and Operation Sangaris forces have qualified the anti-Balaka politico-military group as the main threat to civilians.

While the new Government appears desperate to reign over the security situation, its resort to reconstitute and rearmed the National Armed Forces (FACA) exposes a major flashpoint with partners.  Perceived as being corrupt, ethnic-affiliated and sectarian-tainted, MISCA and partner countries are reluctant and have expressed preconditions including effective vetting before considering the request from the President to arm FACA as a complement to current peacekeeping forces.

Problem solutions

The recent precipitated withdrawal in April of 850 Chadian soldiers from MISCA, has further complicated peacekeeping operations. Contrary to the allegations labelled on a contingent of Chadian troops by NGO’s and the UN Human Right Commission of killing unarmed civilians, an African Union Commission own investigation into the event, shows that they were ambushed by elements of anti-Balaka forces, in northern  Bangui.

The reform of the security institutions is inseparable from the success of the transition, but how to proceed remains unclear. As standalone priority for supporting the transition, the future UN multidimensional mission (MINUSCA), has as an additional task, to support security-wide reforms, but will only do so ‘’as conditions will permit’’. Although, the resolution establishing the new Mission requests the SG to start planning for the additional tasks including security reforms, it is unclear what types of conditions will dictate or influence the rollout of an integrated support to the CAR. Would factors that will determine support be technical, financial, organizational or political?

Fortunately, advancing the SSR agenda has been made easier by the legacies of previous efforts at reforms. Even though past initiatives yielded no tangible results, there’s an old draft national SSR policy framework based on the 2008 Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper as well as an SSR Sectoral Committee including a Permanent Technical Secretariat on priorities.  A framework to organize the defense and security was drafted for 2009-2013. There’s a strong commitment from the highest level of Government to make the security sector operationally effective. In addition, there are DDR project, institutions and experiences to draw from.

But putting the CAR security sector at the service of building sustainable peace and ensuring human security will in part depends on responding to present challenges as well as anticipating future threats. In the immediate, there’s an emerging tension between the exercise of sovereignty by the Government and the constraint of international law. While the new Government approach to rearm FACA strikes a popular chord among some segments of the population, the insistence of the UN on preconditions including vetting, may mobilise nationalist sentiments against the legitimacy of international community interventions. The President, in placing the issue in the public space, frames the reluctance of the international community as an unnecessary conditionality on the reconstruction of critical state institutions.

A warning shot

And in the medium term, there is a consolidating trend towards marginalization of political parties in the power equation. The CAR peace processes have always anchored on the changing reality on the ground— which since the last decade has privileged those with the argument of force rather than the other way. Contestations of the upcoming elections may further entrench the culture of violence as the preferred approach for regime change.  It remains, in fact unclear what role existing and emerging armed groups will play in the future power sharing arrangements. What if anti-Balaka forces or ex-Seleka coalition organize themselves independently as political parties to participate in the elections?

Even more complicated, is the possibility of strategic alliances between political parties and armed groups. A coalition of forces could change the cost and benefits of spoiling the transition process. In fact, cementing the culture of ‘’either-am- in-charge-or-no-one-else,’’ a signature of the CAR politics. Some members of the former Bozize regime have returned from exile and are seeking to lead the anti-Balaka groups including ex-FACA element.

Some armed groups may use the gains on the ground for political bargaining including redrawing the map of the country. For example, in a recent Communique, the ex-Seleka forces meeting in a Congress in Ndele on May 10, 2014 have announced the creation of a new military structure designated the ‘’Forces Republicaines,’’ with new demands that go well beyond representation in the Government. In their press release, they announced secession as an end goal and call for the International Community to support and facilitate the partitioning of the country. It remains unclear whether it is a tactical move to boost their negotiating position or an endgame in itself.  

Meanwhile, perennial instability in the CAR, a potential haven for transnational terrorists groups. While there’s no indication of Islamic infiltration into the country, the persistent sectarian nature of the conflict may likely invite key global terrorist groups. Al Queada in the Maghreb has already issued threats of revenge for the killings of Muslim populations. It remains unclear how the complex savannah and partly jungle territory may influence tactical and logistic capabilities of the Sahelian-experienced groups.it is also unclear what support will ex-Seleka forces not traditionally united by religion will give to Islamist terrorist groups.

Added to the threats, is the seamless availability of weapons across the country. While there has been a gun control law since 1960, just before the current crisis, an estimated 50000 small arms and light weapons were in circulation[1]. The proliferation of small and light weapons in the country is a major hurdle to the security of Bangui and the rest of country. Large quantities of weapons and ammunition are in the hands of armed groups and self-defence militias poses a great challenge to the peace and security in the country. The porous borders accelerate the flow of weapons. Because of the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the National Commission against Small Arms and Light weapons estimated   that over 150000 guns made their way into the country.

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[1] The Central African Republic  National Commission for the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons Report, 2012.